The Doctrine of Right to Counsel: Its Impact on the Administration of Criminal Justice and the Legal Profession by Steele, Walter W., Jr.
SMU Law Review
Volume 23 | Issue 3 Article 4
1969
The Doctrine of Right to Counsel: Its Impact on
the Administration of Criminal Justice and the
Legal Profession
Walter W. Steele Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Walter W. Steele Jr., The Doctrine of Right to Counsel: Its Impact on the Administration of Criminal Justice and the Legal Profession, 23 Sw
L.J. 488 (1969)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol23/iss3/4
THE DOCTRINE OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL: ITS IMPACT ON
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
by
Walter W. Steele, Jr.*
T HE SYSTEM for the administration of criminal justice is in the form
of a continuum, with various stages ranging from the initial arrest to
parole.' Each stage of the continuum serves two functions: first, to screen
out some of the population of the continuum (the accused or the con-
victed, as the case may be) and second, to impose some process which
makes the remaining population ready for the next stage. For example, at
the grand jury stage a person is either no-billed (and thus screened out
of the continuum), or he is indicted, which prepares him for the next stage
(pretrial) along the continuum.
Two distinct branches are involved in the process of decision-making
in the continuum; i.e., the courts and judges from the stages of arrest
through appeal, and the boards and administrators from the stages of
conviction to final discharge. This bifurcation results in a hiatus in com-
munication and cooperation between functionaries in the continuum. For
example, prison officials supposedly possess expertise in the subject of re-
habilitation, but because they belong to an administrative stage, they take
no part in sentencing decisions, which are assigned to a judicial stage.
In the few years since the 1963 decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,' the
doctrine of right to counsel has been expanded to include many of the pre-
trial as well as some of the post-trial stages of the criminal continuum.
This Article will attempt to show that the expansion of the doctrine of
right to counsel from the trial stage to pre- and post-trial stages of the
continuum will have a more pervasive impact than simply providing in-
creased legal service to persons charged with an offense. Notably, some of
the basic characteristics of the criminal justice continuum in the pre- and
post-trial stages will be changed as a result of this expansion. For example,
the infusion of lawyers into the post-conviction stages of imprisonment
and parole will mean that for the first time these stages will have an ele-
ment (the presence of the lawyer) in common with earlier stages, such as
trial and sentencing. Once the presence of the lawyer is routinely accept-
ed at all of these stages, it may serve to curtail the lack of coordination
between the judicial and administrative decision making processes.
As will be demonstrated, the expansion of the doctrine of right to coun-
sel will impose new burdens on the legal profession. Not only will the pro-
fession be forced to supply competent and affordable manpower, it will be
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called upon to provide new models and new norms for the delivery of
legal service to the accused. It will be demonstrated herein that many of
the characteristic and traditional forms of lawyering are inapposite to the
type of legal service called for at some of the pre- and post-adjudication
stages of the criminal continuum.
In order to develop the theme of the pervasive impact of the doctrine
of right to counsel, this Article will first examine the constitutional justi-
fication of the doctrine. This will be accomplished through a discussion
of the rhetoric of the courts together with a survey of those stages in the
continuum where the doctrine has been applied to date. Following this
discussion of the substantive aspects of the doctrine, is set out a descrip-
tion of the roles of the lawyer in the administration of criminal justice.
The various lawyer roles are examined from the points of view of the
client as one recipient, and of the criminal justice continuum as another.
By dichotomizing lawyer roles into client relationships verses continuum
relationships, the unique quality of the lawyer roles is revealed. It will be
demonstrated that the nature of the lawyer roles is such that they provide
indispensable services to the client and to the continuum simultaneously,
and without any inherent conflict of interest. Finally, this Article will ex-
plore the potential impact of the doctrine of right to counsel on the crimi-
nal justice process. It will be argued that the unique capacity of the lawyer
to serve both the client and the continuum simultaneously is the harbinger
of some unanticipated consequences of the doctrine of right to counsel.
The doctrine's impact, beyond the simple provision of more lawyers for
more people, will be developed through a discussion of the effect of the
doctrine upon both the legal profession and legal education.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
DOCTRINE OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution declares: "In
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ...to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."' The development of a judicial
interpretation of the word, "right," as employed in this phrase, is essen-
tially the history of the doctrine of right to counsel. "Right to have as-
sistance of counsel" could reasonably be interpreted in any one of three
ways:
(1) The accused has a constitutionally guaranteed option to em-
ploy counsel.
(2) The accused has a constitutionally guaranteed option to have
counsel assigned if he cannot afford to employ one.
(3) The Constitution requires that counsel be employed or as-
signed whether or not desired by the accused.
The history of the sixth amendment is of little assistance in deciding
which of these three meanings was intended. Most of the original colonies
had laws dealing with right to counsel, and the drafters of the amendment
'U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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were obviously familiar with them. However, the scope of the right varied
between colonies, and there is no way of knowing which interpretation
the drafters intended to adopt.' Probably the most realistic interpretation
of the available history is that the constitutional draftsmen gave the mat-
ter no careful thought. Beaney, the most thorough chronicler of the sub-
ject, states:
The provision in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution emerged in an
atmosphere of silence concerning the intentions which produced it. Since
there was a general understanding that the federal courts would have juris-
diction of an insignificant number of criminal proceedings, the logical as-
sumption is that no great thought was given to the precise nature of the
federal right to counsel.5
Peculiarly, the Supreme Court did not settle upon one of the three pos-
sible meanings of the phrase until one hundred and forty-six years after it
was placed in the sixth amendment. In the case of Johnson v. Zerbst, de-
cided in 1937, the Court opted for the second possible interpretation; that
Itright" meant a constitutionally guaranteed option of the accused to have
counsel, assigned or employed. The Court said:
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime
to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an
essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive an
accused of his life or liberty. When this right is properly waived, the assist-
ance of counsel is no longer a necessary element of the court's jurisdiction to
proceed to conviction and sentence.
Johnson v. Zerbst was restricted by its language to the federal system; it
was another twenty-six years before the Court, in Gideon v. Wainwright,'
imposed the same requirement upon the states. Although Gideon settled
the question of the application of the sixth amendment right to counsel
to the states, the extent of the right at each stage of the criminal process
remains unsettled.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO THE
DOCTRINE OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The sixth amendment is the sole source of constitutional language that
expressly refers to a right to counsel. However, the Supreme Court has
not limited itself to the sixth amendment to expand the doctrine of right
to counsel. In some cases the Court has held that the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment require that counsel be
assigned to the indigent defendant. The rhetoric of the Supreme Court
right to counsel cases will be discussed at this point with a view of locating
some unifying principle between the sixth amendment right to counsel
"See W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS (1955); Comment, An
Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000
(1964).
5 W. BEANEY, supra note 4, at 25.
8304 U.S. 458 (1938).
7 
Id. at 467-68.
8372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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cases and those cases relying upon the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
A. The Sixth Amendment as a
Vehicle for Right to Counsel
When the sixth amendment was written the processes of applying cri-
minal sanctions, as well as the role of a lawyer within those processes, was
relatively primitive. Hence, the amendment speaks in terms of a "criminal
prosecution" giving the right of counsel to an "accused" for his "defence."
As a vehicle for expanding the doctrine of right to counsel, this language
of the sixth amendment is both too narrow and too broad. The words
ccriminal prosecution" and "defence" are too narrow because it strains
their plain meaning to extend their import to some of the modern stages
of the criminal continuum; stages which did not exist when the sixth
amendment was written.! For instance, it has been held that the sixth
amendment will not serve to extend the doctrine of right to counsel to
inmates seeking post-conviction relief, because there is no "criminal prose-
cution" or "defence" involved at this stage." It may reasonably be argued
that it was the recognition of just such limitations which caused the Su-
preme Court to use the fifth amendment as the rationale for Miranda v.
Arizona" instead of the sixth amendment which had been applied in the
earlier case of Escobedo v. Illinois."
The words "criminal prosecution," "accused," and "defence" as used in
the sixth amendment set definite longitudinal limits on the right to coun-
sel, but they do not set any vertical limits, i.e., to any particular level of
criminal prosecutions. In this respect the language of the sixth amendment
is overly broad. Certainly, a requirement of assigned counsel in every
criminal prosecution, no matter how minor or how trivial the possible
sanction, would place a severe and constant strain on any judicial system.
The Court seemed to have this fact in mind when it decided Betts v.
Brady13 in 1942, holding that the states were under no sixth amendment
obligation to provide counsel in all criminal cases. Even now, five years
after Betts has been overruled by Gideon, the matter of whether counsel
must be provided in all criminal prosecutions is far from settled.
On its face, therefore, the sixth amendment is sufficiently broad to ap-
pear to require assigned counsel at any criminal prosecution; and yet the
sixth amendment is apparently so narrow that it does not require counsel
at significant non-judicial stages. In order to escape this enigma, the Su-
preme Court has sometimes used the fourteenth amendment to extend the
doctrine of right to counsel.
' E.g., "When the Bill of Rights was adopted, there were no organized police forces as we know
them today. The accused confronted the prosecutor and the witnesses against him, and the evidence
was marshalled, largely at the trial itself." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
"Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1965); Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d
445 (9th Cir. 1962).
" 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
12378 U.S. 478 (1964).
" 316 U.S. 455 (1942). The majority opinion contains a survey of the law of each state which
established that no state provided assigned counsel in all criminal cases.
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B. Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause) as a
Vehicle for Right to Counsel
Normally, the Supreme Court attempts to maintain a balance between
what it foresees as constitutionally desirable, and what it senses to be pre-
sently practical.' For this purpose, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment provides a convenient tool. The due process clause allows the
Court to posit a principle which is realistic for the time, and yet remains
sufficiently flexible to accommodate some future extension of the princi-
ple, such as the right to counsel. The language of the touchstone case of
Powell v. Alabama' demonstrates the point: "All that is necessary now to
decide, as we do so decide, is that in a capital case ... it is the duty of
the court ... to assign counsel . . . as a necessary requisite of due process
of law . . . ."" Thus the Court settled the question of the day, while leav-
ing the door open for future changes.
Since Powell, cases which have dealt with right to counsel as a part of
due process may be divided into two categories: those which employ the
"special circumstances" test, and those which employ the "critical stage"
test. Prior to Gideon the Court consistently employed the "special circum-
stances" test in which the right to counsel was held to apply because the
Court found a lack of fairness in the facts of the specific case. Townsend
v. Burke" and Moore v. Michigan'8 stand as examples of cases which ap-
plied the "special circumstances" test. In both of these cases it was held
that, under the particular circumstances, due process required that the
right to counsel be extended to the accused. In both cases some untoward
event had occurred in the course of the proceedings; in Townsend the
judge obviously misinterpreted the presentence report, and in Moore
an uneducated Negro received a maximum sentence without the benefit
of cross-examination or mitigating testimony. The Court in both cases
appeared to limit its holding to the facts before it. There was no necessary
implication from either of these cases that due process required that the
right to counsel should be uniformly extended in the future to cases in-
volving similar circumstances.
After Gideon (which applied the sixth amendment right to counsel to
the states as a part of due process) the Court began to employ the "critical
stage" test to extend the right to counsel. Under the "critical stage" test,
right to counsel is not necessarily limited to the case before the Court; the
right is extended to all future cases where the particular critical stage may
arise. Thus, under this test the assignment of counsel apparently becomes
an invariable procedural step for future cases, regardless of circumstances.
For example, in United States v. Wade" the Court held that conducting
a line-up was a critical stage, requiring the assignment of counsel at line-
4 Compare Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), witb Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514
(1968).
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
"Id. at 71.
17334 U.S. 736 (1948).
" 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
19388 U.S. 218 (1967).
[Vol. 23
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
ups held in the future. Similarly, in Mempa v. Rhayu the Court held that
probation revocation was a critical stage, with the result that the presence
of counsel is necessary in future instances where probation is to be re-
voked. Apparently the Court does not intend to completely abandon the
"special circumstances" test in favor of the "critical stage" test. A juxta-
position of the opinions in Hamilton v. Alabama" and White v. Mary-
land" demonstrates this point.
Hamilton was decided before Gideon, so the "special circumstances"
test was applicable. In Hamilton an unrepresented indigent pleaded not
guilty at his arraignment. The Supreme Court held that a lawyer was con-
stitutionally required at this arraignment, because in Alabama certain
defenses are considered abandoned if not raised at arraignment. Since the
"tspecial circumstance" in this case was the peculiar nature of the Alaba-
ma statute, there was no particular reason to believe that the Hamilton
decision extended the right to counsel at arraignment beyond the Alabama
jurisdiction.
White v. Maryland involved the right to counsel at a preliminary hear-
ing. Under the applicable Maryland statute no rights are lost at a prelimi-
nary hearing as they are under the Alabama statute in Hamilton. In White
an unrepresented indigent entered a guilty plea at his preliminary hearing,
and this fact was made known to the jury at a subsequent trial on the
merits (where the defendant plead not guilty). Since White was decided
after the Gideon case, the "critical stage" rule was applicable and in re-
versing the conviction the Court reasoned:
Whatever may be the normal function of the 'preliminary hearing' under
Maryland law, it was in this case as critical a stage as arraignment under
Alabama law. For petitioner entered a plea before the magistrate and that
plea was taken at a time when he had no counsel .... We therefore hold that
Hamilton v. Alabama governs and that the judgment below must be and is
reversed."
Why did the Court state that Hamilton v. Alabama governs the issue?
Should not Gideon v. Wainwright have governed the issue (that is if the
'tcritical stage" test has replaced the "special circumstances" test) ? Why
did the Court emphasize that the Maryland preliminary hearing was a
Ctcritical stage in this case"? The quoted language seems to imply that the
preliminary hearing would not have been "critical" had it not been for
the "special circumstance" that the guilty plea was introduced into evi-
dence at the main trial. The answer to the question of whether or not the
Court intends to completely abandon the "special circumstances" test in
favor of the "critical stage" test is found in the case of Pointer v. Texas4
which was decided after Hamilton v. Alabama and White v. Maryland.
In Pointer the defendant contended that the failure to appoint counsel to
represent him at the preliminary hearing was a violation of his constitu-
0 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
2'368 U.S. 52 (1961).
2"373 U.S. 59 (1963).
2a Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
24380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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tional right to counsel as established by the Hamilton and White decisions.
The Court disposed of the defendant's contention with this statement:
[T]he State informs us that at a Texas preliminary hearing, such as is in-
volved here, pleas of guilty or not guilty are not accepted and that the judge
decides only whether the accused should be bound over to the grand jury and
if so whether he should be admitted to bail. Because of these significant differ-
ences in the procedures of the respective States, we cannot say that the White
case is necessarily controlling as to the right to counsel.'
The Pointer case demonstrates the importance of the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause as a vehicle for the expansion of the right to
counsel doctrine. The critical nature of any given stage in the criminal
justice continuum may vary significantly between states (as in the case of
the preliminary hearing-arraignment stage). In these cases the Court ap-
parently intends to continue to rely on the pre-Gideon "special circum-
stances" test as a part of fourteenth amendment due process. On the other
hand, in those instances where the critical nature of any given stage is
fairly uniform between the states (as in the case of line-up or probation
revocation) the Court apparently intends to rely on the post-Gideon "crit-
ical stage" test as a part of fourteenth amendment due process. Thus, the
fourteenth amendment serves a sort of double duty in the expansion of
the right to counsel doctrine.
C. Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection Clause) as a
Vehicle for Right to Counsel
The notion of equal protection of the laws has been used by the Court
on occasion to extend the doctrine of right to counsel. The equal protec-
tion clause states: "[N]or shall any state . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."26 On its face, this language is
subject to but one construction, i.e., a state may not apply its laws in a
discriminatory fashion. Consistent with this construction the Court held
in Griffin v. Illinois" that the state must furnish an indigent with a tran-
script for his first appeal, because such transcript was sine qua non to
appeal under Illinois statutes. In another case the Court ruled that if a
state statute provides that transcripts are to be made at hearings for post-
conviction relief, those transcripts must be supplied free to a penurious
inmate. Another court has held that if a state statute expressly allows
representation by counsel at revocation proceedings, then equal protection
demands the assignment of counsel for indigents at such proceedings.29
In Douglas v. California'° the Court held that counsel must be furnished
to indigent appellants, although no California statute expressly mentioned
the appearance of counsel on appeal. The Court said: "[T]hat equality
[is] demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who
25Id. at 402-03.
" U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, 5 1.
27351 U.S. 12 (1956).
2
'Long v. District Ct. of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
2 Hoffman v. State, 404 P.2d 644 (Alaska 1965). But see Brown v. United States, 351 F.2d
564 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966).
20372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the
record ... while the indigent ... is forced to shift for himself."" Thus, in
Douglas the Court apparently abandoned the necessity for positive state
action in order to invoke the equal protection clause, and adopted a substi-
tute principle of economic balancing.
Is there a beginning and ending to the notion that equal protection of
law requires a coextension of rich man-poor man opportunity to enjoy
the services of a lawyer? A rich man is always enjoying the benefit of
something, while the indigent is forced to shift for himself. A rich man
can retain a lawyer immediately upon his arrest, and keep the lawyer
searching for relief all the way to the last day of the sentence. Does equal
protection of law require that an indigent be extended the same oppor-
tunity to utilize counsel? The operative answer, at least for now, is "no."
The Court seems to appreciate the unlimited consequences which its eco-
nomic balancing doctrine might entail. Consequently, the Court has
equivocated its Douglas opinion by stating that "[a]bsolute equality is
not required; lines can be and are drawn and we often sustain them. 32
As the Court has said, lines can be drawn; but the problem is, how does
one draw them? On at least two occasions since Douglas the Supreme Court
has declined the opportunity to "draw the line" on the question of whether
or not economic balancing requires assigned counsel in post-conviction
relief cases.3
D. Integration of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
Approaches to Right to Counsel
The basis for the right to counsel doctrine could have been limited to
the sixth amendment since only that amendment speaks to the doctrine in
express terms. Therefore, why should the fourteenth amendment even be
considered as an independent vehicle for right to counsel? The answer
seems to lie in the primary concern of the Court for fairness to the accused
at all stages of the criminal continuum. In the language of the Court:
"[T]he accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the
state at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out
where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair
trial."'
The Court is willing to engage in as much "amendment jumping" as
necessary to expand the doctrine of right to counsel, because the Court
considers counsel to be the paladin of fairness to the accused.' If the Court
is faced with a clear case of a critical stage in a criminal prosecution (i.e.,
line-up in Wade) it will employ the sixth amendment as the rationale for
1 Id. at 358.
"Id. at 357.
33 Johnson v. Avery, 37 U.S.L.W. 4128 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1969); Long v. District Ct. of Iowa,
385 U.S. 192 (1966).
"' United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
' The Court has made numerous references equating counsel with fairness, e.g., "In sum, the
principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases requires that we scrutinize any pretrial con-
frontation of the accused to determine whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve
the defendant's basic right to a fair trial. ... Unitd States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
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right to counsel. On the other hand, where the facts present a stage which
is unique to one particular state (i.e., the arraignment-preliminary hearing
in Hamilton and White) the Court may rely upon fourteenth amendment
due process as the rationale for right to counsel. In other cases (e.g.,
Douglas v. California) the Court has chosen fourteenth amendment equal
protection as the rationale for right to counsel.
It is clear that the Court does not intend to be hemmed-in by the re-
strictive language of the sixth amendment (i.e., "criminal prosecution,"
"accused," "defence").
Accordingly, there seems to be no constitutional limitation on the scope
of the right to counsel doctrine. Using fairness to the accused as the stan-
dard, the Court is free to expand or contract the doctrine by the selective
integration of the sixth and fourteenth amendment approaches. One of
the federal circuit courts has expressed the point succinctly: "[T]he ap-
pointment of counsel may sometimes be mandatory even in those areas in
which the Sixth Amendment does not apply. This is true when the cir-
cumstances of a defendant or the difficulties involved in presenting a par-
ticular matter are such that a fair and meaningful hearing cannot be had
without aid of counsel."3
III. A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO THE
DOCTRINE OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
As indicated in the preceding section, the pattern of the extension of
the doctrine of right to counsel can best be explained substantively by
using the abstraction: fairness to the accused. But what might be the re-
sult if the cases are approached from a functional viewpoint, i.e., from
the standpoint of the particular stages in the continuum where right to
counsel has already been extended? Is there something inherent in these
particular stages which results in right to counsel being extended to them,
and not extended to other stages? How does the Court select the particular
stages where fairness to the accused dictates that the right to counsel must
be extended?
The stages of the criminal justice continuum are usually interdependent.
For example, if a grand jury returns an indictment in inappropriate lan-
guage the subsequent trial is of no consequence, even though the trial
itself may have conformed to all of the legal requirements. Given this
interdependence, the difficulty of determining what motivates the Court
to select any particular stage for the extension of right to counsel is ap-
parent. The stages to be discussed are arranged in the sequence in which
they normally occur. The first stage is the arrest stage, followed by the
grand jury stage, and the preliminary hearing-arraignment stage. These
are the stages most common to the initiation of a criminal prosecution.
The intervening stages are the plea bargaining stage, the trial stage, the
sentencing stage, and the appeal stage. Finally, the corrections stage will
be examined.
"SDillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 446-47 (9th Cir. 1962); accord, e.g., La Clair v.
United States, 374 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1967).
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The Arrest Stage. The onus of being placed under arrest is enough to
justify consideration of extending the doctrine of right to counsel to that
stage. Of those arrested many are discharged before they reach the trial
stage of the continuum. Is the right to counsel advisable in order to en-
hance the accuracy (fairness) of the arrest decision, or might this be a
waste of scarce legal talent since the suspect has a good chance of being
released anyway? Originally, counsel was not a constitutional necessity at
any time during arrest, because arrest was held to be investigative, rather
than accusatorial.38 Escobedo v. United States,"5 Miranda v. Arizona," and
United States v. Wade"1 changed that. Paradoxically, all three of these
cases are limited to some specific activity incidental to the arrest, i.e., in-
terrogation or line-up. None of these cases considered the social handicaps
brought on by the arrest itself. The coerciveness of interrogation or line-
up can be minuscule compared to the consequences of the loss of liberty or
the loss of access to friends and relatives that results from being placed in
custody. Nevertheless, under the present state of the law, the right to
counsel during custody, absent some special circumstances, does not exist.
The Grand Jury Stage. After arrest, in most jurisdictions, serious cases
are forwarded to a grand jury. It is difficult to imagine a stage where a
lawyer could be more useful to insure fairness to the accused. The weight
and sufficiency of the evidence against the accused is examined by the
grand jury in an informal atmosphere and the decision to indict is in the
form of an edict, instead of an articulated judgment. Furthermore, the
grand jury hearing provides the individual with an opportunity to become
one of the drop-outs in the criminal process.
In the case of In re Groban41 the Supreme Court held that an individual
called to testify before a grand jury has no right to counsel. This holding
appears to overlook the seemingly critical nature of the grand jury hear-
ing, and its obvious potential for mistake, prejudice, and arbitrariness. The
Court reasoned in Groban that sufficient protection is provided grand jury
witnesses by the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In
light of Miranda and Wade, the Court might overrule Groban when pre-
sented with an opportunity.' It does seem incongruous to proclaim the
necessity for a lawyer to protect the rights of an individual when he is
subjected to interrogation or line-up by the police, while denying the same
individual a right to counsel when he is subjected to the similar tactics of
a grand jury.
The Preliminary Hearing-Arraignment Stage. The functions and tim-
"See L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES 9 (1965); P. TAPI'AN,
CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 360-66 (1960).
a See Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 199 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 631 (1942).
9378 U.S. 478 (1964).
40 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4' 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
42 In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957) (this case involved a fire inquest, but the court com-
pared the proceeding to a grand jury hearing).
4 The dissenting opinion of Justice Black in Groban was referred to with favor in United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 231 n.15 (1967).
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ing of the preliminary hearing-arraignment stage vary between states.
Generally, the preliminary hearing or arraignment serves to identify the
defendant, establish probable cause, accept pleas, and fix bail. The nuances
of the doctrine of right to counsel at this stage have already been dis-
cussed." Suffice it to say that it is often impossible to know whether
counsel is constitutionally required at this stage in the continuum. One
court has made the point in this language: "From Hamilton v. Alabama
and White v. Maryland, it is plain that there is no arbitrary point in time
at which the right to counsel attaches in pre-trial proceedings .... Rather,
the 'critical' point is to be determined both from the nature of the pro-
ceedings and from that which actually occurs in each case."'
The Plea Bargaining Stage. Plea bargaining is obviously a significant
stage for any defendant who wants to "make a deal." In Doughty v.
Sacks" the Ohio supreme court held that the right to counsel is waived
when a guilty plea is entered unless the defendant positively indicates his
desire that counsel be appointed. The United States Supreme Court re-
manded with instructions that the case be further considered in light of
Gideon."7 Upon remand, the Ohio court reaffirmed the conviction, and
again emphasized that the onus was on the defendant to request counsel
at the time of his plea. 8 Thereafter, in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme
Court reversed the conviction."" The Supreme Court's reference to Gideon
appears to have extended the doctrine of right to counsel to the plea
stage. It remains unclear, however, whether the defendant has the same
right to counsel while the plea is being negotiated with the prosecutor."0
Logically, at least, that point at which the plea is actually bargained for is
as significant as that point at which the plea is formally entered and
received.
The Trial Stage. Elasticity remains in the definition of the sort of offense
to which the right to counsel must be extended. While factors of cost and
manpower dictate that some limitation be placed upon the obligations of
the government to furnish assigned counsel in criminal cases, such limita-
tions should not be based merely upon doctrinaire labels. As stated by Mr.
Justice Stewart in Winters v. Beck:
In Gideon v. Wainwright, we said that 'any person haled into court, who is
too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is pro-
vided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth' . . . . No State should
be permitted to repudiate those words by arbitrarily attaching the label 'mis-
demeanor' to a criminal offense. 1
c"See t xt accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
"5 United States v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608, 611 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964).
40 173 Ohio St. 407, 183 N.E.2d 368 (1962).
47 Doughty v. Maxwell, 372 U.S. 781 (1962).
"SDoughty v. Sacks, 175 Ohio St. 46, 191 N.E.2d 727 (1963).4
°Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964).
50 Compare Anderson v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930 (W.D.N.C. 1963), with People v.
Bowman, 40 I1. App. 2d 116, 239 N.E.2d 433 (1968).
" Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907, 908 (1966) (dissent from denial of certiorari).
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In the absence of a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court, a number of
theories have been used to delineate the scope of right to counsel at the
trial stage." Generally, the decision turns upon the "seriousness" of the
offense," or just the fact that liberty may be lost." The case of Duncan v.
Louisiana,"5 decided by the Supreme Court in 1968, is indicative of the
Court's attitude on the seriousness of the offense which will justify the
extension of right to counsel. In Duncan the Court recognized that there
is a limitation to the type of offenses which are deserving of a jury trial
(another sixth amendment right)." Furthermore, the Court showed a
preference for a potential six months' imprisonment as the dividing line
between petty and serious offenses."
The Sentencing Stage. Whether or not sentencing is a critical stage de-
pends upon the import of the equivocal language of Mempa v. Rhay.ss
Mempa extended the right to counsel to hearings for revocation of proba-
tion where the sentence was to be set for the first time. However, Mempa
did not even mention the case of Specht v. Patterson,"9 decided seven
months earlier, where the Court had said: "We held in Williams v. New
York that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
require a judge to have hearings and to give a convicted person an op-
portunity to participate in those hearings when he came to determine the
sentence to be imposed.""0 Mempa's failure to discuss Specht and Williams"'
leaves some doubt about the Court's intentions as to the critical nature of
sentencing hearings."5 Nevertheless, despite the evasiveness, a conservative
interpretation of Mempa is that sentencing is a critical stage, requiring the
assignment of counsel for indigents.
The Appeal Stage. In Douglas v. California," the Court extended the
doctrine of right to counsel to the point of first appeal. In the later case
of Anders v. California4 the Court went so far as to require that assigned
2 Comment, The Indigent Defendant's Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 19 Sw. L.J.
593 (1965). In a majority of jurisdictions assigned counsel are not regularly provided in cases
of "misdemeanor" or "petty offenses." E.g., Satterwhite v. State, 423 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Crim. App.
1968); Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1964).
"'See State v. Madison, 240 Md. 2d 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965).
" See generally Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law, 41 F.R.D.
389, 398 (1966). See Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942); People v. Mallory, 378
Mich. 538, 147 N.W.2d 66 (1967).
55 391 U.S. 145 (1968); see Note, The Right to Trial by Jury in State Court Prosecutions, 22
Sw. L.J. 875 (1968).
" "It is doubtless true that there is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject
to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision and should not be subject to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment jury trial requirement here applied to the States." 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968).
17 1d. at 159-61. But see Dejoseph v. Connecticut, 222 A.2d 752 (Conn.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 982 (1966).
58 389 U.S. 128 (1967). For a complete discussion of Mempa, see Cohen, Sentencing, Probation,
and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View frons Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1968).
59386 U.S. 605 (1967).
"I1d. at 606.
" Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
6'See United States v. Garrick, 399 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1968) (holding that motion to reduce
sentence does not entitle defendant to a hearing, because it is addressed to the discretion of the
court).
63372 U.S. 353 (1963).
64386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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counsel may not withdraw from an appeal he considers to be frivolous
unless he first files a brief setting forth "anything in the record that might
arguably support the appeal.""5 Therefore, appeal is one stage where the
doctrine of right to counsel may be considered fully implemented.
The Corrections Stage. Traditionally, the courts have adopted a "hands-
off" attitude with respect to the corrections process." This judicial policy
may be the result of a failure to conceptualize corrections as a part of the
criminal justice continuum:
The pattern of protective law governing the process of guilt determination
constitutes as complex and elaborate a structure of limitations upon the exer-
cise of governmental power as will be found in our system of law. . . But
the mood abruptly changes once guilt is finally adjudicated and the pertinent
questions turn on dispositions of the convicted. . . .The dominant theme
then becomes the freedom of the official to exercise his discretion rather than
the freedom of the individual from the exercise of unconfined power.67
It is not surprising, therefore, that Mempa v. Rhay," decided in 1967, is
the first Supreme Court case to hold that the right to counsel exists at a
post-conviction stage (revocation of probation). Most courts continue to
hold that a parolee is not entitled to so much as a hearing upon parole re-
vocation" and, consequently, is not entitled to counsel."
Some courts assign counsel in post-conviction habeas corpus cases, but it
is on an ad hoc basis, according to the difficulty and apparent validity of
the issues raised by the pleadings."1 By contrast, when a case is on first
appeal, the Supreme Court has refused to sanction any scheme allowing
the appellate court to survey the probity of the allegations before a lawyer
is assigned."' There is good reason to believe that the Supreme Court has
no present intention of extending the right of counsel to post-conviction
habeas corpus. The Court denied certiorari in the case of United States ex
rel. Coleman v. Denno" wherein the circuit court had answered the fol-
lowing question in the negative: "Does the refusal of New York through
its Court of Appeals to assign to a defendant, convicted in a capital case
l Id. at 744.
66 See generally Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review
the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
e7Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN.
L. Ruv. 803 (1961). Recently, the courts are displaying more willingness to act in this area. See
generally Note, judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 178
(1967).
68 Note 58 supra.
65 Compare Mottran v. State, 232 A.2d 809 (Maine 1967); Martin v. Board of Parole, 350
Mass. 210, 213 N.E.2d 925 (1966), with Shelton v. United States Bd. of Parole, 388 F.2d 567
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
7 See Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963);
Milligan, Parole Revocation in California and the Federal System, 4 CALIF. WEST. L. REv. 18, 29
(1968).
"E.g., Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962). At least one state has codified
this approach. See generally Note, The Ohio Post Conviction Determination of Constitutional
Rights Act: Recent Developments, New Problems, and Suggested Solutions, 37 U. CIN. L. REv.
310 (1968).
72 "The assistance of . . .counsel in preparing and submitting a brief ... which designates and
interprets the relevant portions of the trial transcript . . . may not be denied to a criminal de-
fendant." Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 259 (1967).
7' 313 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 919 (1963).
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and sentenced to death, counsel to serve in post appellate and Federal Court
proceedings constitute a violation of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?"74
In the recent case of Johnson v. Avery"5 the Court ignored another
opportunity to extend the doctrine of right to counsel to post-conviction
relief. The question in Johnson was whether or not a prisoner could be
denied the right to assist other inmates with their petitions for post-convic-
tion relief. Instead of relying on the doctrine of right to counsel, the Court
employed the issue of access to the courts as the rationale for the decision:
"[I]t is fundamental that access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose
of presenting their complaints may not be denied or obstructed."7 It
appears, therefore, that the present Court does not consider post-conviction
relief to be one of the "critical stages" of the criminal process.
Summary. From the foregoing discussion a list of some of the specific
procedural points in the continuum where right to counsel has been ex-
tended may be made as follows:
Arrest: Right effectively limited to interrogation and line-up.
Grand Jury: No right.
Preliminary Hearing-Arraignment: Right limited to instances where
the hearing results in waiver of rights, or the hearing seriously in-
criminates the defendant.
Trial: The only limitation is the potential length of punishment.
Sentencing: Apparently unlimited right.
Appeal: Unlimited right.
Probation Revocation: Apparently unlimited right.
Parole Revocation: No right in most courts.
Post-Conviction Relief: An ad hoc right in some courts.
This list demonstrates that the doctrine of right to counsel is like a light
bulb, sometimes lit, sometimes dimly flickering, and sometimes completely
extinguished. What accounts for this on-again, off-again status? At the
beginning of this section the question was asked: "How does the Court
select the particular stages where fairness to the accused dictates that the
right to counsel must be extended?" Is it possible to posit an answer to
this question through an analysis of the above list of stages in the con-
tinuum? It may be argued that the risk of conviction serves as the answer
to the question of how the Court singles out a particular stage for the ex-
tension of right to counsel. A conviction results in far more than the im-
position of a punishment; it results in a stigma, a social stamp which is
often more painful than the physical discipline itself.
In order to test this postulate, it is helpful to re-examine each point at
which right to counsel has been said to exist. For instance, counsel is not
required while a person is being detained in custody unless he is to be
interrogated or placed in a line-up. It is activities such as interrogation and
74 Id. at 460.
75393 U.S. 483 (1969).Tld. at 485, 487.
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line-up that produce the greatest risk of conviction; not the act of arrest
itself. The knowledge or suspicion which resulted in the arrest is not in-
creased by the mere act of arrest, but that knowledge or suspicion may be
increased by interrogation or line-up. Accordingly, the right to counsel is
extended to such activities, but not at other points throughout the arrest
and detention. Similarly with the preliminary hearing-arraignment stage,
there is no right to counsel unless the procedure is apt to affect the trial or
its outcome. If the preliminary hearing-arraignment is a mere mechanical
device preparatory to trial, right to counsel is not extended.
Consistent with this hypothesis, right to counsel has been fully extended
to the stages of trial and appeal. It is at these stages that the risk of final
conviction is most obvious. Counsel has been extended to the sentencing
stage, because the degree of social stigma which results from the conviction
is dependent upon the type of sentence assessed. As pointed out earlier, the
social stigma of conviction is often as painful for the accused as the con-
viction itself. In part, this fact accounts for the Court's refusal to extend
right to counsel to all misdemeanor cases. If the offense is slight, then the
stigma of the conviction is diminished.
Admittedly, the paradox between requiring counsel at probation revo-
cation and not at parole revocation is difficult to justify with any unifying
principle. It is submitted, however, that the parolee in our society already
suffers from the stigma of his prior incarceration. Therefore, most courts
do not afford him the same consideration as the probationer who has not
yet been stamped as "an ex con."" For similar reasons the right to counsel
has not been extended to prison inmates, because they are in the very state
of conviction and detention, and already subject to the ultimate stigma.
IV. A RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND A ROLE FOR COUNSEL
Whatever the reason or justification, the courts are, in fact, extending
the doctrine of right to counsel to an increasing number of stages through-
out the criminal justice continuum. Therefore, it is important to ask: Just
what is the role of the lawyer in this continuum? What is it about a law-
yer that causes the courts to put so much faith in his presence? For the
purposes of this discussion, the "role" of the lawyer is defined as the con-
tribution which the lawyer makes as he participates in the criminal justice
process. The lawyer's ultimate contribution (role) at any point may be
the result of a whole series of specific tasks or jobs. For example, one role
of the lawyer which is most significant to the defendant is that of ob-
taining the best result. In order to play this role, the lawyer has a number
of specific jobs to do. He must investigate the case, research the law, and
negotiate with the prosecution.
The following discussion of the roles of the lawyer is divided into two
parts. The first part deals with some of the attorney-client roles. The
second part deals with the attorney-system roles. It will be argued that as
the attorney fulfills his attorney-client roles, he simultaneously fulfills
"In Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968), the Court judicially recognized the "disabilities
or burdens" which may flow from a conviction.
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certain roles for the criminal justice system which are indispensable to its
operation.
A. The Attorney-Client Roles
The Interpersonal Role. The most easily understood role of the attorney
is in the interpersonal relationship he has with his client. The contribution
of the lawyer in this interpersonal role is to interpret the criminal process
to the client, and to offer him a guiding hand through it. One task the
lawyer could perform as a part of this interpersonal role is to make the
application of the criminal sanction socially meaningful to the client. If
the lawyer is able to inject the client with a sense of full and fair treat-
ment, the client may be more receptive to the rehabilitation that is theo-
retically available upon conviction." Scant attention has been given to this
aspect of the lawyer's interpersonal role, and lawyers rarely attempt to
interpret the social significance of the sanction to the client. 9
A common task of the lawyer in the interpersonal role is to continually
analyze the client's bargaining position, and communicate the alternatives
to him.s" The significance of this task goes beyond the obvious necessity of
giving technical advice to the client. In fact, the client may become
mentally and emotionally debilitated unless he is regularly advised of his
status. If the client is suffering from frustration and tension which come
from a lack of information about his legal status, then the potential for
satisfactory fulfillment of the attorney-client relation is diminished.
The Agent Role. Another role which the lawyer plays as a part of the
attorney-client relationship is the role of agent for the client. Rather than
attempt to list all the jobs performed or performable by lawyers in the
agent role, some of the more typical will be discussed. It may seem trite
to state that the lawyer, as the client's agent, must investigate the facts of
the case. However, one court has held that this is not a compelling lawyer
task. In State v. Childssl a defendant was held one hundred and twenty-
one days without counsel being assigned. The defendant contended that
the failure to assign counsel during this period deprived him of an investi-
gative agent to contact witnesses in his behalf. The court made this re-
sponse: "In such a case, counsel would be performing only a notification
function, and not a legal advice-giving or truth-testing function that
only a lawyer can perform. In most cases, including this one, such notifi-
cation would not require legal expertise.""2 The court seems to have mis-
1 D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT
TRIAL 199 (1966). See also Holton, Prevention of Delinquency Through Legal Counseling: A
Proposal for Improved Juvenile Representation, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1080 (1968).
5""Perhaps a broader view of the lawyer's role should include within the counseling function
the duty to attempt to make the client aware of the fact that he has a problem and of his need for
some correctional program. Thus far, however, lawyers have preferred to avoid the welfare im-
plications of their role as counselors and the conflicts this role would create and to limit their
role to getting the client 'as good a deal' as they can." TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 111
(1967).
8SNEW YORK CITY BAR ASS'N, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED 35 (1959). See, e.g., Evans
v. Rives, 126 F.2d 663, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
" 140 Ohio St. 2d 56, 236 N.E.2d 545 (1968).
s2 Id. at 548.
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interpreted the lawyer's agent role. As an agent for the client, the lawyer
may perform a variety of functions which do not require legal expertise.
The importance of having a lawyer as an agent is that he can perform
many functions, only some of which require legal expertise. Even when
the lawyer performs some lay function, he does it with the aid of lawyer
status. Thus the client may receive the benefit of what the lawyer can
obtain by a simple show of authority.
Another task of the lawyer as agent is to be a sort of ambassador be-
tween various participants as they come and go throughout the con-
tinuum. For example, the lawyer may work with the complainant, the
prosecutor, and the judge to bring about a dismissal of a substantially
weak case. Recent emphasis on the role of lawyers in juvenile proceedings
has stimulated discussion of this envoy function."5 There is often an inter-
locking sense of embarrassment, resentment, and fear between case worker,
parent, and child in delinquency cases. The lawyer may be the only par-
ticipant with adequate linkage to move freely among all the parties. This
allows him to interpret and placate, and at the same time structure a result
in the best interests of his client.
The lawyer, as agent for his client serves to marshal and present facts
and law in logical fashion.84 This includes the burden of challenging dis-
puted facts,85 and submitting appropriate legal defenses." In addition, the
lawyer is expected to protect his client from being subjected to unlawful
procedure.87 Since the lawyer has entered into a personal relationship with
his client, he is often the participant in the best position to recognize and
assess the validity of the assumptions which have been made by the other
participants. He may quickly know if the police have arrested the wrong
man, or if there is a prima facie case, or if the exclusionary rule makes the
showing of a prima facie case impossible. The lawyer may protect the
client from further illegitimate harassment by making these facts force-
fully known to the court and to the prosecution at the outset.
B. The Attorney-System Roles
The doctrine of right to counsel is generally thought to reflect a concern
to protect the individual. However, the presence of a lawyer is as useful
and necessary to the criminal justice system as to the client. In other
words, there are attorney-system roles which are just as operative and
functional as attorney-client roles. The implications of the doctrine of
right to counsel become more apparent when this transcendent quality of
the lawyer is understood. Some of the tasks of the lawyer which were just
discussed in the attorney-client context will be re-examined at this point,
"
3 E.g., Levin, The Role of the Lawyer in Juvenile Proceedings, 39 PENN. B.A.Q. 427 (1968).
84E.g., Darnell v. Peyton, 160 S.E.2d 749, 751 (Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1968); TASK FORCE RE-
PORT: THE COURTS 19.
85E.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 563 (1966).
8E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
87See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470
(1966). Just how the lawyer is supposed to protect his client from unlawful procedures is not alto-
gether clear. See Gilbert, The Role of the Defense Lawyer at a Line-lip in Light of the Wade, Gil-
bert and Stovall Decisions, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 273 (1968).
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in the context of the attorney-system role. This will serve to demonstrate
the transcendent quality of the lawyer.
Contributor of Information. The analogue of the attorney-client task of
investigation is the attorney-system task of the contribution of informa-
tion. The criminal justice system is such that prosecution may be com-
menced upon inadequate or incomplete information. If some facts are
missing (i.e., evidence of innocence or lack of responsibility) the criminal
justice system relies upon the defendant's lawyer to complete the factual
picture. If he fails to do so, it tends to confirm the accuracy of the in-
formation already on hand. In this way the lawyer contributes sub-
stantially to the investigative capacity of the various stages of the criminal
continuum, and consequently to the legitimacy of the final result. As a
practical matter, the lawyer saves the prosecution the time and expense
of a complete investigation; a very substantial attorney-system contribu-
tion. Of course, the lawyer does not provide the prosecution with infor-
mation which is subversive to his client; supposedly the prosecution
already has that information.
The Lawyer as Expeditor. As the lawyer goes about the task of repre-
senting the client, he also acts as an expeditor of the system's formalities.
The substantive law, the rules of evidence, and the order of procedure are
all supplied by the criminal justice system. The system relies upon the
lawyer to carry out its substantive and procedural ritual in proper order.
Thus, the lawyer makes objections, raises defenses, files pleadings, and
otherwise fulfills this purpose." This role is not as mundane as it first
sounds if one considers the systemic consequences of not having a lawyer
to carry it out. In the lawyer's absence, some other party, such as the
judge, or prosecutor, or the defendant himself, has to play the mechanical
part. Indeed, this situation may now be found in the lower courts, with
the consequence that these courts, and the quality of their justice, have
lost the respect of the community.
From the context of the attorney-client roles, this mechanical task of
activating the system's rituals has a very different significance. What is
mechanical in the attorney-system roles, is persuasive in the attorney-
client roles. The system relies upon the lawyer to make the objection; the
client, however, relies upon the lawyer not only to make the objection but
to make it in a manner so that it will be sustained. The system is concerned
that its rules be operational; the client, however, is concerned that they
operate in his favor." Thus the lawyer makes a contribution to the client
and to the system simultaneously. The realization that the lawyer plays
this dual role may lead to the conclusion that the lawyer is a sort of in-
vidious "double agent."" In fact, however, the lawyer's responsibility to
'
8 See, e.g., Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967); Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136
(1965).
88See generally D. NEWMAN, supra note 78, at 218-23.
"
0Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game, I L. & Soc'y REV. 15 (1967).
1969]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
his client is not compromised by his dual role. The effect is simply that the
particular usefulness of the lawyer changes with the frame of reference.
The Lawyer as a Policeman. It is questionable whether some of the crimi-
nal justice participants are especially concerned with accuracy. Were it
not for the mandate of due process, they might completely succumb to a
bureaucratic desire to facilitate case flow at the expense of a few "mis-
takes." Therefore, when a lawyer protects his client from some ill con-
sidered act he also polices the system. The system cannot adequately police
itself, because of an inherent bureaucratic flaw.
What generally occurs in practice is that at some early point a familiar pat-
tern will seem to emerge from the evidence; an accustomed label is waiting
for the case and, without awaiting further proofs, this label is promptly as-
signed to it .... [W]hat starts as a preliminary diagnosis designed to direct
the inquiry tends, quickly and imperceptibly, to become a fixed conclusion,
as all that confirms the diagnosis makes a strong imprint on the mind, while
all that runs counter to it is received with diverted attention."
Courts usually respond to this bureaucratic phenomenon by imposing
judicial-type procedures on an agency or institution."2 In part, this is a
recognition of the fact that the lawyer does perform a service for the sys-
tem as a policeman, because the presence of a lawyer is often a part of the
judicial-type procedure which is imposed. This habit of imposing these
procedures on administrative agencies overlooks the fact that the agency
may have been created just because the courts could not contend with the
work assigned to that agency. 3 The adversary process which is inherent in
judicial-type proceedings is not always suitable for the work assigned to
an agency. In other instances, the work of the agency may have a low
priority in the traditional pattern of court functions.
Whenever an agency is faced with the presence of a lawyer it tends to
react by tightening its routine, not necessarily because of what the lawyer
does, but because of the threat of what he might do. This "implicit threat
syndrome" is due, in part, to some intangible fear that the lawyer will
make visible some heretofore invisible deficiency. This fear is apt to remain
as long as the agency is not sure of what the lawyer may do if present; it
is most prominent therefore, when the lawyer is not a programed part of
the procedure.
It is unrealistic to expect to completely judicialize the administration of
criminal justice because it is too expensive and too inefficient to do so. The
"implicit threat syndrome" could serve as a device for compromise be-
tween judicial due process, and some lesser form of procedural fairness for
those stages where use of administrative format and discretion is a para-
mount consideration. The occasional appearance of counsel before an
agency might be more effective insurance against abusive practices than
91 ABA Rep. of the Joint Conf. on Prof. Responsibility, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1160 (1958).
"UE.g., "Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however
benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure." In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
'" See Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427 (1960); Hand-
ler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 479 (1966).
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having counsel routinely present. Obviously, the random use of right to
counsel would be less expensive than universally extending it at any par-
ticular stage. If counsel were only randomly assigned at some stages there
would be more money available to appoint counsel for a greater range of
cases than at present.
C. Summary of the Roles of Counsel
The outstanding characteristic of the lawyer is his ability to induce a
standard of fairness into the inherent conflict between the desire of the
accused to be free from punishment, and the desire of the criminal justice
system to impose punishment as a sanction for misconduct. To accomplish
this purpose the lawyer must serve both sides of the conflict in a fashion
germane to their own frames of reference. The lawyer has developed a
skill which allows him to maintain a single professional identity as he plays
out his attorney-client and attorney-system roles. Thus, regardless of the
difference in the contribution that the lawyer makes to the client or to the
system, both of them afford the lawyer the same type of professional iden-
tity. The lawyer serves both the client and the system as an indispensable
party charged with the responsibility of bringing fairness to the tension
between the client and the system. Because of this transcendent quality of
the lawyer, the expansion of the doctrine of right to counsel will have an
impact far beyond increased assistance to individuals charged with crime.
As the doctrine of right to counsel expands, and as the lawyer begins to
perform new tasks for the client, he will simultaneously bring about
changes in the criminal justice process.
V. THE IMPACT OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL UPON THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PROCESS: SOME PREDICTIONS
Any attempt to measure the impact of the doctrine of right to counsel
should be done in terms of what is true today, together with what might
be true should the doctrine be fully implemented. The combined effect of
increased use of lawyers plus their ability to mix freely among other func-
tionaries in the criminal justice system dictates that the system will
undergo considerable modification: "Experience has shown that when good
lawyers are brought into criminal practice, their impact is felt far beyond
the cases they handle. They ask questions and put pressure on everyone in
the system to examine what they are doing and why. They organize re-
form, and become a powerful force for change."94 Some of the changes
which may be expected as a result of the expansion of right to counsel are
discussed below.
A. The Impact of Counsel on Case Flow
The proficiency of the criminal justice continuum for moving cases
seemingly depends upon three factors: (1) the rate at which cases are
ingested; (2) the rate at which cases are discharged at all stages; and (3)
the rate at which cases are passed from one stage to another. The rate at
9' TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 57,
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which cases are ingested into the continuum is largely a function of ar-
rests by police. Several variables affect arrest rates, but the availability of
lawyers for indigent defendants is not one of them. The only caveat is the
extent to which lawyers may serve as a force to inhibit harassment or
suspicion arrests. Essentially, however, the doctrine of right to counsel has
little to do with how many cases are ingested into the continuum.
Beyond arrest, each stage of the continuum serves as a screen, so that a
portion of the population (suspects, defendants, or convicts) is eliminated
at each stage." Obviously, the presence of lawyers serves to increase the
population attrition at each stage. The "implicit threat syndrome" teaches
that even the occasional presence of a lawyer will likely increase attrition.
The last of the three factors that regulate case flow in the continuum
is the rate at which cases are passed from one stage to another. Some meld-
ing of the continuum stages might be expected as the impact of the law-
yer's increased presence takes full effect. As an example, it is reasonable to
assume that the sooner counsel is given an opportunity to represent the
client, the sooner such counsel can make definitive decisions. Therefore, if
counsel were present soon after all arrests, he might quickly decide to enter
into plea bargaining, thus advancing the sentencing stage in the con-
tinuum.
There is a popular notion that the presence of lawyers causes delay and
a resultant backlog of cases." One study has shown that after right to
counsel was extended to juvenile courts the backlog of cases did increase,
even with the addition of more judges." Another writer has reported that,
partly because of right to counsel, guilty pleas in Washington, D.C. have
declined 40% in the last two years.
What if this reduction in case flow is accompanied by an increase in
dismissals due to lack of evidence? In New York the "law guardian" con-
cept resulted in a 74% increase in the use of lawyers in juvenile cases and,
as a consequence, the number of cases dismissed for lack of evidence in-
creased."' It could be argued that whether or not lawyers delay case flow
is partially dependent upon the quality of police work. If the police do a
thorough and legal job of detection, then less time need be spent weeding
out weak cases. In any event, there can be little doubt that the expansion
of the doctrine of right to counsel will reduce the speed with which cases
are moved from one stage to another through the continuum.
B. Impact of Counsel upon Corrections
One noticeable impact of right to counsel should be to encourage the
development of more and better forms of community treatment for of-
fenders. There is already general agreement among penologists and crimi-
" Of 300,000 felony arrests annually, only 140,000 are sentenced. L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE
OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 9 (1965).
"'TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 52-53.
9 7 Coxe, Lawyers in Juvenile Court, 13 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 488 (1967). See generally
Ketcham, Can Gault's Guidelines Protect Public Interest, TRIAL at 15 (April/May 1968).
"Wright, The Need for Education in the Law of Criminal Correction, 2 VAL. U.L. REP. 84
(1967).
" Isaacs, The Lawyer in the Juvenile Court, 10 CRIM. L.Q. 222, 227 (1968).
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nologists that sentences are too high and that probation and parole are not
used enough.' The initiation of the lawyer into the post-trial stages
would provide a persuasive articulation of that viewpoint. If the use of
community treatment is increased, it naturally follows that the character-
istics of institutionalized convicts will change. "A decision during the pre-
or post-trial periods to incarcerate fewer offenders very likely will mean
that those who are eventually incarcerated may be the least promising of
all offenders and thus make more difficult the tasks of dealing with them. If
this is the case, the impact on both prisons and parole will be noticeable.''.
It seems reasonable to assume that if the prisons are filled with inmates
who are more recalcitrant than at present, the spate of cases seeking post-
conviction relief and prisoners' rights will probably increase. In turn, this
would further increase the need for extension of the doctrine of right to
counsel to the post-conviction stage. This is an excellent example of how
the presence of a lawyer at one point in the continuum can serve to in-
crease the need for lawyers at another point in the continuum.
Even now, consideration is being given to the advantages of extending
right to counsel to prison inmates."°' The President's Task Force on Cor-
rections has listed some of the correctional benefits which could flow from
assigning counsel to prisoners, which may be paraphrased as follows:'0 '
(1) Facilitated access to the courts.
(2) Increased visibility of the legal process to the inmates.
(3) Mobilized forces for reform.
(4) Discouragement of inhuman or illegal practices by virtue of
lawyer's presence.
It is patently unfair to fault prisoners for seeking court relief of their
grievances. In the words of one prison writ writer: "[I]t is not unusual,
then, in a subculture created by the criminal law, wherein prisoners exist
as creatures of the law, that they should use the law to try to reclaim their
previously enjoyed status in society."' ' Nevertheless, one possible impact
of extending right to counsel to prisons is that it will be easier for prison-
ers to make frivolous claims. However, the empirical evidence absolutely
refutes this theory. The University of Kansas operates legal clinics in both
federal and state prisons. The Kansas experience has been that a prisoner
usually is willing to drop a frivolous claim if the law is explained and
clarified to him."5 Furthermore, the Public Defender of Wisconsin reports
00See generally M. GRUNHUT, PENAL REFORM, A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1948); D. NEW-
MAN, CONVICTION 229 (1966); England, What is Responsible for Satisfactory Probation and Post-
Conviction Outcome?, 47 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 667 (1957).
'01 Empy, Alternatives to Incarceration, in STUDIES IN DELINQUENCY 11 (U.S. Dept. H.E.W.
1967).
" One obvious advantage is relief to the courts which are flooded with inarticulate writ peti-
tions. See Johnson v. Avery, 37 U.S.L.W. 4128 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1969); Judicial Conference of the
United States, Report of the Committee on Habeas Corpus, 33 F.R.D. 367 (1963).
' PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
CORRECTIONS 85 (1967). [hereinafter cited TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS].
'
5 4
Larsen, A Prisoner Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 343, 347 (1968).
" Letter from Benjamin G. Morris, Associate Director, Clinics Programs, University of Kansas
to Walter W. Steele, Jr., Aug. 6, 1968; see Hubanks and Linde, Legal Services to the Indigent Im-
prisoned, 23 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 214 (1961); Wilson, Legal Assistance Project at Levenworth,
24 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 254 (1966).
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that in one ten-month period he declined thirty frivolous cases, after ex-
plaining to each prisoner that their claims were without merit. Only six of
these thirty prisoners requested another attorney, although they all had a
right to do so under the Wisconsin statutes.' Another example is the ex-
perience of the Public Defender of Oregon. He reports that after three
years of operation, the number of requests for post-conviction relief in his
jurisdiction has stabilized."'
Statistics from the Oregon Public Defender indicate the extent to which
post-conviction relief appeals may actually be frivolous. Of direct appeals
brought by this office, 24% have resulted in reversal of conviction. In the
same period, of post-conviction appeals brought by this office, 22% have
resulted in reversal of conviction.' This provides some support for the
notion that, when supervised by a competent attorney, post-conviction ap-
peals are no more frivolous than direct appeals.
Prison officials, as a group, are probably the most susceptible to the im-
pact of counsel on corrections, because of the threat it poses to their broad
discretion."9 Even so, those prison officials who were interviewed by this
writer recognized the correctional benefits to be had from the availability
of some sort of prison house counsel. They were anxious to be rid of the
jailhouse lawyer, and to free their own personnel from the chore of at-
tempting to give legal advice." They also spoke of the boost to overall
prison morale which the availability of lawyers would bring to the pri-
soners.
Courts are slowly beginning to accept the proposition that constitution-
al safeguards protect all men, including prisoners."' Although the right
to counsel has not been extended to prisons, lawyers have an essential role
to play in corrections. The correctional system will benefit as much as the
inmates should the courts extend the doctrine of right to counsel to that
stage. With lawyers representing prisoners, the rehabilitative ideal may be-
come an operational policy, instead of a mere philosophical notion.
C. The Impact of Counsel on the Parole Process
Most courts have not yet extended right to counsel to the parole stage,
but the momentum of the doctrine indicates that eventually all indigent
'0' Note, Legal Services for Prison Inmates, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 514, 527-28.
107 Office of the Public Defender of the State of Oregon, Supplemental Report to Public De-
fender's Program Statement X (undated and unpublished report of Oregon Public Defender);
letter from Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, State of Oregon to Walter W. Steele, Jr., Aug. 1,
1968.
10 Office of the Public Defender of the State of Oregon, Supplemental Report to Public De-
fender's Program Statement X, supra note 107, at i-ii.
109 E.g., "Some correctional authorities believe that legal controls will make it difficult to main-
tain security within institutions and to protect the community against dangerous offenders." TASK
FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 83.
11 Mr. Justice Douglas has recognized the fact that when prisoners are denied lawyers they will
create their own substitutes: "Where government fails to provide the prison with the legal counsel
it demands, the prison generates its own. In a community where illiteracy and mental deficiency
is notoriously high, it is not enough to ask the prisoner to be his own lawyer." Johnson v. Avery,
393 U.S. 483, 496 (1969).
"' Compare Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915 (1955),
with United States ex rel. Yaris v. Shaughnessy, 112 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See generally
Note, Constititional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PENN. L. REV. 985 (1962).
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parolees will have the right to assigned counsel.1 2 At present, there is no
effective judicial force limiting parole administration. Therefore, the pre-
sence of counsel at the parole stage will mean that fundamental concepts
of individual rights and due process will, in many instances, become op-
erative at this stage for the first time. If the presence of counsel slows the
parole system (as it undoubtedly will) then it will only indicate that the
system, at present, is sacrificing the individual for the sake of speed and
efficiency. The administration of parole relies upon two largely fictitious
rationales: (1) parole is a matter of grace, and not a matter of right, and
(2) parole is a statutory-administrative institution, and as such is immune
from judicial interference."' It is reasonable to assume that these two ra-
tionales will be vigorously and successfully attacked once the right of
counsel is extended to the parole stage."'
Whether the number of paroles granted would increase or decrease as
a result of the extension of the right to counsel to the parole stage is un-
certain. It seems fallacious to attribute any increase or decrease in parole
rates solely to the fact that lawyers are representing prospective parolees.
The grant or denial of parole should depend upon the characteristics of
the prospective parolees, not the quality of their legal representation.
Parole administration is replete with examples of coercive and legally
questionable practices that might be abated by counsel. For example, re-
strictive conditions in parole "contracts," such as limitations on travel and
marriage, frequently have no tenable connection with parole success. An-
other example of coercive parole administration is the practice of "jail-
house counseling," which occurs when a field agent feels that a parolee is
becoming recalcitrant, and places him in jail for a few days on the pre-
tense of a parole violation. The parolee is not released until he displays the
proper respect for the agent and the parole contract. In other cases, prose-
cutors have attempted to use the parole status to short circuit the law. For
example, parole agents are sometimes used to conduct custodial interroga-
tions of parolees on the premise that Miranda does not apply to such situ-
ations."
As it now operates, parole administration is exempt from many of the
guarantees of fairness which are present in the other stages of the con-
tinuum. The convict must feel a sense of helplessness and despair when he
attempts to deal with a parole board he rarely sees, and one whose policies
and practices sometimes violate basic standards of justice. The extension
of the doctrine of right to counsel to the parole stage will insure the pre-
112 In the state of Washington an attempt is being made to extend right to counsel to parole
by statute. Letter from J. Walter Gearhart, Administrative Assistant, Board of Prison Terms and
Parolees, State of Washington to Walter W. Steele, Jr., Sept. 11, 1968.
"a See generally S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTIONS 551-53 (1963).
'..See Menechino v. Board of Parole, 293 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Commonwealth v.
Tinson, 249 A.2d 549 (Pa. 1969); Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal:
The View From Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1968).
"' The Supreme Court expressly disapproved of this practice in a case where an internal revenue
agent conducted the interrogation: "We find nothing in the Miranda opinion which calls for a
curtailment of the warnings to be given persons under interrogation by officers based on the reason
why the person is in custody." Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1966).
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sence of lawyers to successfully articulate the need for improvement at
this stage.
D. The Impact of Counsel on Operational Costs
It is not possible to make a realistic economic appraisal of the overall
impact of right to counsel on the criminal justice continuum. However,
changes in certain specific cost factors are reasonably foreseeable. On the
side of increased cost is the obvious expense of paying for the expanded
employment of lawyers at various stages of the continuum. This will be
discussed in detail in a later section dealing with logistics of providing
counsel. Additional money will be needed to provide staff for the increased
use of non-custodial penal sanctions such as probation and parole. Further-
more, any slowing of the flow of cases as a result of the lawyers' insistence
upon the rigid demands of due process will result in a natural increase in
costs. On the other hand, if the predictions made herein prove correct, the
tendency will be an increased utilization of the least costly parts of the
continuum. Thus operation of the continuum would involve less trial
time, less use of appellate and post-conviction remedies, and less institution-
alization. It is impossible to say where the final financial balance will be
struck.
VI. THE IMPACT OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL UPON
THE LEGAL PROFESSION
The criminal justice continuum is not the only institution that will be
altered by the impact of the doctrine of right to counsel. The legal pro-
fession will also be forced to undergo some modification. Bluntly stated,
the doctrine of right to counsel (when fully extended) will demand more
legal services than the profession is currently prepared to deliver. For in-
stance, one of the most frequent allegations in post-conviction petitions is
that the trial attorney was incompetent,' and some courts have reversed
cases because the trial attorney was not sufficiently experienced. 1 ' In each
of these instances, the attorney involved had previously been declared
116 H. Kerper, Development of a Theoretical Foundation for Use of Writs in the Resocialization
Process in the Correctional Setting (unpublished LL.M. thesis in the Library of Florida State Uni-
versity). The frequency of complaints in writs filed by Florida state prisoners in 1964 and 1965
was stated to be as follows (disregarding all of those solely Gideon related):
45.29% -incompetent or dishonest counsel
3 5.29%- no counsel at non-trial stages
15.29% -both of above
27.64% - tricked or coerced confession or plea
18.82% - illegality of arrest
17.64% - delays in legal process
16.47% -no preliminary hearing
14.709o-not properly advised of rights
14.70% - illegal search
14.70% -conspiracy involving police, court, or counsel
14.11% - no grand jury hearing
11.76% - cruel or brutal treatment
7.6 5% - complaints about sentence
"" Ex parle Larkin, 420 S.W.2d 958 (Tex. Crim. App..1967) (attorney licensed ten years had
appeared in only two suits); Rodriquez v. State, 340 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960) (attorney
licensed four years, but no prior felony experience; see Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
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competent to practice law by the organized bar and the state. This is just
one example of the gap between the doctrine of right to counsel and the
current norms of the legal profession.
A. The Need To Define and Articulate New Roles
It is commonly understood that lawyers and trials go together, like
bread and butter. But what happens when a lawyer is suddenly thrust into
some new and unfamiliar stage of the criminal justice continuum? He may
find himself with no apparent role to play, and no training to guide his
actions. It is up to the legal profession to define and articulate roles for
lawyers in these situations. Should the profession fail to do so, the average
lawyer will amount to no more than an irrelevant appendage at these
stages.
Sentencing is a stage in the continuum where improvement in the defi-
nition of the lawyer's role must be made. During interviews conducted as
a part of the research for this Article, judges, prosecutors, and probation
officers were almost unanimous in their opinion that lawyers have very lit-
tle impact on a judge's sentencing decision. The most frequently men-
tioned failings of lawyers at sentencing were as follows:
1. Failure to sincerely present the character of the defendant as an
individual person.
2. Attempts to qualify or minimize the guilty plea.
3. Failure to verify statements presented as fact.
4. Failure to suggest sentencing alternatives.
5. Failure to present witnesses.
6. Failure to logically articulate rehabilitation plans.
It is encouraging to note that the American Bar Association has recently
described a very responsive and realistic role for lawyers at sentencing."'
The lawyer's role is formulated in a series of specific tasks which the law-
yer is encouraged to complete prior to the sentencing hearing as follows:
1. Ascertain what sentencing alternatives are available to the court.
2. Ascertain what community facilities are available to meet the
needs of the particular defendant.
3. Explain consequences of likely sentencing alternatives to the de-
fendant, and solicit his views.
4. Develop special alternatives for the particular defendant through
combination of all the above.119
This response by the ABA to the need for definition and articulation of
the role of the attorney at sentencing is a perfect example of what must
be done for other non-trial stages of the criminal justice continuum.
Parole is a stage where the legal profession has not yet defined and artic-
ulated its role. Consequently, there is a popular feeling that lawyers have
no place in the parole process. As one court has said:
1I ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING ALTERNA-
TIVES AND PROCEDURES 32-34 (1968). See also Pharr, On Sentencing: What A Judge Expects From
Defense Counsel, I PRAC. LAW. 76 (1955).
1.. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING ALTERNA.
TIVES AND PROCEDURES 32-34 (1968).
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The period of contentious litigation is over when a man accused of crime
is tried, defended, sentenced and, if he wishes, has gone through the process
of appeal. Now the problem becomes one of an attempt at rehabilitation. The
progress of that attempt must be measured, not by legal rules, but by the
judgment of those who make it their professional business. So long as that
judgment is fairly and honestly exercised we think there is no place for
lawyer representation and lawyer opposition .... 120
It is submitted that there is a place for the lawyer at the parole stage, al-
though the legal profession has failed to clearly define it. After all, the
parole process is involved with the collection, presentation, and interpre-
tation of facts-just like the trial process. A social history should be as es-
sentially factual and fairly composed as a confession, a deposition, or a bill
of particulars. Parole administrators and lawyers alike would benefit if the
organized bar would act now to define and articulate the role of lawyers
in parole. Without such a professionally sponsored movement, the tension
between parole boards and the bar will increase as the court decisions ap-
proach the extension of right to counsel to the parole stage.
B. The Necessity To Distinguish the Adversary Model
from the Advocacy Model
As long as the lawyer was confined to the courtroom, the adversary
model was quite adequate. In this setting each lawyer is called upon to
present only those facts which best support his side of the issue. The op-
posing lawyer can be relied upon to complete the factual picture. When
the doctrine of right to counsel took the lawyer out of the courtroom he
brought this adversary model with him. But such a model does not always
harmonize with some of the new responsibilities of the lawyer. In the past,
lawyers were concerned mainly with issues of guilt or innocence. Once
guilt was determined, other functionaries were viewed as primarily re-
sponsible for the job of applying sanctions and treatment. The expansion
of the doctrine of right to counsel has changed this view.
As the lawyer has been initiated into new stages of the continuum, he
has incurred additional responsibilities. As a result, the lawyer must now
concern himself with more than the guilt or innocence of his client. At
some of the new stages the lawyer is cast into the role of overseer, or inter-
preter, or contributor of alternatives. In some of these roles it is more
appropriate for the lawyer to be an advocate, rather than an adversary.
The failure of the legal profession to make any distinction between the
responsibilities of the lawyer as an advocate and the responsibilities of the
lawyer as an adversary results in an awkward ethical contradiction. As
stated by the President's Task Force on the Courts: "Sworn to uphold the
law and at the same time to serve his client's best interests, counsel may
be faced with an insoluable human and professional conflict .... At pres-
ent we have no idea of the extent of this role conflict and its consequences
to the profession." 2'
The confusion which results from failure to make any distinction be-
'"°Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332, 334 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970 (1961).
121 TASK FoRcp REPORT: THE COURTS 114.
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tween the lawyer as an advocate and the lawyer as an adversary is aptly
demonstrated in two statements, both from the same source:
[T]he presence of a lawyer, playing an adversary role, is the best single
means of insuring that a juvenile court judge will focus solely on deciding
the case before him according to law ...
A sensitive lawyer will recognize that his role is not necessarily to help a kid
beat the rap. A sensitive lawyer, like a sensitive judge or a sensitive social
worker, knows when confession is good for the soul."'
The confusion extends to the Cannons of Ethics. ABA Cannon 37
requires a lawyer to keep his client's confidences-characteristic of an ad-
versary-while Cannon 22 requires fairness and candor when dealing with
the court-characteristic of an advocate. What, for example, is the posi-
tion of the lawyer at sentencing if the court asks him to reveal his client's
previous convictions? The ABA Committee on Legal Ethics and Griev-
ances suggests that the lawyer should refrain from answering; a solution
which does not appear to be either functional or professional, and which
seems at odds with the rhetoric of candor and fairness."'
Plea bargaining is a stage where the advocate-adversary distinction is
more obvious. While the need for counsel at plea bargaining is well recog-
nized,2 4 there is little need for an adversary at this stage. At plea bargain-
ing, like some of the other non-trial stages of the continuum, the trial court
type of adversary simply is not relevant. From the client's result-oriented
perspective what is needed, however, is an advocate; someone to initiate
negotiations, pick the most lenient court, and make the "best deal."
The professional ambivalence over the characterization of the lawyer is
largely responsible for the reluctance of many criminal justice function-
aries to favor the extension of the doctrine of right to counsel. This doc-
trine has taken the lawyer out of the courtroom, but the lawyer has, in
effect, tended to take the courtroom with him. Too many people, lawyers
included, continue to think of the criminal lawyer as a pyrotechnist. The
profession must modify its operational models, or run the risk of losing
its monopoly on the delivery of legal services."5
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL EDUCATION
Since lawyers are being called upon to practice in new settings and to
perform new and different jobs, some thought should be given to their
12' Coxe, Lawyers in Juvenile Court, 13 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 488, 490 (1967).
" Gold, Split Loyalty: An Ethical Problem for the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 14 CLEV.-MAR.
L. REV. 65, 74-75 (1965). Because of this enigma, it has been suggested that lawyers be replaced
altogether by some new functionary. Rossett, The Negotiated Guilty Plea, 374 ANNALS 70, 78-79
(1967).
124 "Whether or not plea bargaining is a fair and effective method of disposing of criminal cases
depends heavily on whether or not defendants are provided early with competent and conscientious
counsel." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 11 (1967). See e.g., Austin v. State, 422 P.2d 71 (Idaho
1966).
"55The Supreme Court has already attacked the "closed shop philosophy" of the legal profes-
sion: "We think of claims as the grist mill for the lawyers .... There are not enough lawyers
to manage or supervise all of these affairs . . . . Yet, there is a closed shop philosophy in the




educational preparation. It serves no useful purpose to enter into the de-
bate over whether or not law schools ought to graduate a lawyer who is
prepared to practice law. A multitude of authors have already spoken to
that subject ad nauseam.' Perhaps legal education should simply get on
with the business of doing what it claims to do, i.e., training legal minds.
In that context, the issue becomes: What can legal education do to respond
to the growth of the right to counsel doctrine?12
Law schools might begin by explaining the relationships between social
conduct and rules of law. So far, the jurisprudence of social control has
been haphazard and unscientific. Laws are passed and enforced without re-
gard for consequences which are often more harmful than the initial
evil. 2 ' The tendency to ignore social sciences is not easy for law schools to
overcome, because their own self-interest is at stake:
Since judges are less well-educated than the average . . . teaching bar, there
is never any deficit of judicial limitations to be pointed out. This work of
the law professor is so pleasant and so lacking in risk, . . . that it is a real
sacrifice, a labor of love, for a law professor to get deeply involved in inter-
disciplinary exploration, since this means surrender of that sanctuary."'9
Difficult as it may be to accept, it is increasingly obvious that some tra-
ditional law courses are irrelevant. For instance, when 60 to 80% of all
defendants plead guilty, is it rational to concentrate upon the intricacies
of trial procedure-and teach little or nothing about plea bargaining?...
The modern lawyer must deal as much with legal systems as legal cases.
The well known third-year doldrums might be avoided with courses utiliz-
ing interdisciplinary materials that help the graduating senior to define
his professional roles in systemic terms."'
The cooperative education method offers a promising approach to the
improvement of legal education. The use of cooperative education plans
... An analysis of the many philosophies and theories is presented in Rutter, A Jurisprudence of
Lawyer's Operations, 13 J. LEGAL ED. 301 (1961). See also Note, Modern Trends in Legal Educa-
tion, 64 COLuM. L. REV. 710 (1964). Educational systems for other professions are also being
criticized for failing to graduate a student equipped to practice. See David, Education for the Pro-
fessions: Common Issues, Problems and Prospects, 3 J. ED. Soc. WK. 5 (1967).
... For a few basic recommendations see, Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs
of Criminal Law, 41 F.R.D. 389, 412 (1966).
12 For an excellent discussion of how the law can create unforeseen social consequences see,
Rose, Law and the Causation of Social Problems, 16 SOCIAL PROBLEMs 33 (1968).
"' Riesman, Law and Sociology: Recruitment, Training and Colleagueship, 9 STAN. L. REV.
643, 653 (1957).
" 'Effective counseling regarding the likely consequences of the guilty plea requires the lawyer
to have intimate knowledge of sentencing provisions and procedures, correctional programs, and
parole procedures, as well as, of common criteria used by judges in selecting types and lengths
of sentences. Such knowledge is traditionally less a part of formal law training than is preparation
for defense at trial and calls for additional skills on the part of lawyers in guilty plea cases."
D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION 209 (1966); see Rubin, The Law Schools and the Law of Sentencing
and Correctional Treatment, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 332 (1965).
... It has been established that there is a general decline in interest as the students progress
through law school, and that the decline is greatest in the upper half of the class. Furthermore,
those students in the upper half of the class who are occupied by law review, research assistant-
ships, or outside jobs lose interest in school more than those who have no outside interests: "Some
activities, then were sufficiently absorbing to draw student energy and interest away from the
classroom, or much the same thing, to throw class work into unfavorable contrasts." W. Thielens,
Jr., The Socialization of Law Students 345-50 (1965) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University).
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generally appears to be increasing.'32 Other disciplines, such as engineering,
teaching, and social work, have successfully adopted this educational
method, which combines formal schooling with work experience.' One
advantage of cooperative education is that it forces educators and practi-
tioners to function in harmony and partnership, rather than becoming
caught up in dichotomous philosophies.'34 The doctrine of right to counsel
requires lawyers to perform jobs which call for unique combinations of
skill and intellectual appreciation of systems. The cooperative education
approach helps to achieve the proper balance between skills and doctrine
in legal education. One thing is clear, legal education must adjust its meth-
ods if it is going to meet the demands of the doctrine of right to counsel.
There is a new relevancy for lawyers in the administration of criminal jus-
tice which cannot be taught by the conventional doctrinal approach to
law.
VIII. THE LoGISTICS OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL DOCTRINE
When a court orders the extension of right to counsel to some stage of
the continuum, the public and the legal profession must struggle with the
problem of how to deliver and pay for the new service involved. The man-
ner in which any jurisdiction responds depends upon two factors: (1) the
format which is chosen for the delivery of legal services, and (2) the costs
involved.
A. The Auspices for Furnishing Right to Counsel
The choice of formats for delivery of legal services to indigent defend-
ants is a choice between two basic devices: (1) assigned counsel, and (2)
full time defender:
The central question is whether we should try to meet the need for defense
counsel with lawyers working full-time as defense counsel, presumably paid
wholly or partly from public funds, or to meet it with a vastly expanded pro-
gram of assignments of counsel, calling on the bar to provide its services in
cases which would otherwise go undefended.a"
In most localities the need to provide counsel for the accused has not been
characterized as a social welfare problem calling for community-wide
concern. Viewed as an inherent feature of the legal system, it becomes con-
venient to assign the solution of the need for counsel to the organized bar.
The bar's typical response to the problem has been the assigned counsel
... The Northeastern University School of Law has recently been reactivated under a coopera-
tive educational format. O'Toole, Realistic Legal Education, 54 A.B.A.J. 774 (1968).
... Interview with Mr. William A. Bennie, Director of Student Teaching, College of Education,
University of Texas at Austin, Sept. 5, 1968; Kindelsperger, Modes of Formal Adult Learning in
Preparation for the Service Professions, FIELD LEARNING AND TEACHING (Counsel on Social Work
Education 1968).
134 "One aspect of the conflict, common to all professions, is the value attached to knowledge:
in the university, knowledge is valued for its own sake, and in the world of practice knowledge
is valued for use. But the pattern does not end there. What seems to occur is that the activities
involved in the search for knowledge and the activities involved in using knowledge become valued
for their own sakes." Schubert, Curriculum Policy Dilemma in Field Instruction, 1 J. ED. SOCIAL
WK. 35 (1965).




system. This system has been operative in the United States for over a
century, and is employed in a majority of the jurisdictions today." One
source has noted that while there are distinct advantages to the assigned
counsel system, there are also disadvantages." ' Such a solution preserves
the independence of the attorney-client relationship and the bar; while at
the same time, it provides an opportunity for a wide segment of the bar
to participate in the continuum. It also provides valuable experience for
young lawyers and a source of income for the bar. On the other hand, the
assigned counsel system sometimes provides the client with a lawyer who
is inexperienced in the criminal justice continuum or who is appointed too
late to be effective. It has also been argued that this system places an ex-
cessive burden on the private bar for which it receives inadequate com-
pensation.
The most common argument in favor of the assigned counsel system is
that it affords an opportunity for widespread participation by the bar in
criminal cases. The reasoning is that if every lawyer is afforded an oppor-
tunity to participate in the criminal justice system, it will be continuously
challenged and modernized.
An almost indispensable condition to fundamental improvement of American
criminal justice is the active and knowledgeable support of the bar as a
whole. There is no better way to develop such interests and awareness than
to provide wider opportunities for lawyers to participate in criminal litigation
at reasonable rates of compensation. 3'
In fact, it is facetious to imply that noticeable improvements will be made
in criminal justice by a smorgasbord of general practitioners and commer-
cial specialists. Such logic is part of the self-serving myth that all ordinary
lawyers are willing to devote themselves to the cause of an indigent client.
The unspoken assumption of this myth is that the "civil lawyer" has as
much skill as a "criminal lawyer" in criminal cases. More rational support
for this assumption would be provided if it was conceded that many "civil
lawyers" spend an abnormal amount of time preparing for court appoint-
ed cases because of fear of their inexperience in criminal cases. If this is
true, it nevertheless appears that the appointive method is a circuitous
means of providing adequate and competent counsel to the indigent.
Another method of delivering legal services to the indigent defendant
is to pay full time defenders. The defender system is only about fifty years
old in the United States, and already there are approximately two hundred
publicly supported offices. 3' The obvious advantages of this system are
that it provides experienced, competent counsel; eliminates many unethi-
cal practices; is more economical to operate, at least in metropolitan areas;
and it assures continuity and consistency in defense of the poor. "
136 L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES TN AMERICAN STATE COURTS
15 (1965).
137Id. at 18-32.
"I ATT'Y GEN., REP. ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 34(1963).
"' Silverstein, Manpower Requirements in the Administration of Criminal Justice, in TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 158.
140 L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 45-48 (1965).
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The public defender office can be organized so as to retain many of the
best features of the assigned counsel system. For instance, novice attorneys
may still obtain experience in criminal cases by working in the office on a
paid or volunteer basis. The advantages to the defendants from being as-
signed lawyers who are thoroughly familiar with the criminal justice
processes are obvious. Furthermore, the public defender spreads the cost
of providing legal services to the entire community, where it appropriately
belongs. Most significantly, the public defender system is cheaper to op-
erate than the assigned counsel system.
B. The Cost of Furnishing Right to Counsel
In attempting to evaluate the cost of right to counsel, the first measure
must be of the need for service. In other words, how many indigent de-
fendants are there? It is estimated that each year 314,000 people are
charged with felonies, and an additional 168,000 are involved in appeals,
collateral attacks, revocation proceedings, etc.' 4' Estimates of the propor-
tion of defendants who are unable to pay for an attorney vary from 60%
to 80% .' One compromise is to apply the low of 60% to the 314,000
persons charged with felonies each year, and the high of 80% to the
168,000 annual appeals, revocations and post-conviction remedies. This re-
sults in a total of 322,800 felony matters each year which involve indigent
persons. We may deduct the 22,800 cases handled annually in the federal
system under the Criminal Justice Act.' This leaves 300,000 cases which
must have counsel provided by the local jurisdictions.
The second step in estimating the cost of right to counsel is to compare
the cost of the assigned counsel system with the cost of the full time de-
fender system. An excellent barometer of the cost of an adequate assigned
counsel system is provided by the federal experience with the administra-
tion of the Criminal Justice Act. In 1967, the average cost per case was
$99.00 in the federal system.'" If the same average held true for the
300,000 cases in local jurisdictions, the total cost for assigned counsel
would be $29,700,000.14 On the other hand, a 1966 study of 185 public
defender offices by the American Bar Association revealed that the average
cost per case was $35.00.'4 Therefore, if public defenders handled the
300,000 indigent cases, the total cost would be approximately $10,500,000,
a figure well under the cost of the assigned counsel system.
4
141 TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 55-56. It is estimated that an additional 5,000,000
people are charged with misdemeanor offenses each year. Report of the Conference on Legal Man-
power Needs of Criminal Law, 41 F.R.D. 389, 398 (1966).
143 Id. at 397.
143 1967 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANN.
REP.
144 Id.
145 In fact the states currently spend only about $17,000,000 on defense of the indigent. TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 152.6 ABA, REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
468, 472 (1967).
... There are numerous studies comparing the costs of operation of the public defender with
the assigned counsel system. They all conclude that the public defender system is generally cheaper
to operate. See NEW YORK CITY BAR, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED 30 (1959); L. SILVER-
STEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 63-74 (1965).
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C. A New Alternative
If we must spend additional money for representation of the indigent,
and the statistics suggest that we must, we can at least strive to get the
"most" solution per amount of money spent. One recent suggestion is to
make use of some type of sub-professional or para-professional as a partial
substitute for the more expensive lawyer. 4 ' For purposes of discussion,
this class of workers will be referred to as "law agents." The combination
of a number of circumstances makes the eventual use of law agents in-
evitable. Most compelling is the relative scarcity and expense of lawyers.
Since many of the new lawyer tasks in criminal justice are such that they
can be made mechanical, and thus be performed by laymen, the proposal
becomes even more appealing.
A number of factors must be considered in order to locate the services
that a law agent might perform. There must be a demand for the service
that is large enough to keep the law agent constantly occupied, otherwise
it probably would be cheaper to have the lawyer continue to supply the
service personally. Furthermore, a large volume of work is necessary in
order to create mechanical routines which can be taught to the law agent
with ease.14
Public relations is another factor to be considered in identifying those
services that a law agent might perform. One essential practice in main-
taining good public relations is to utilize the law agent in conjunction with
the lawyer, rather than in lieu of him. In the present state of affairs a
"client" receives legal services from a layman (real estate agent, insurance
adjustor, trust officer, etc.) without ever seeing a lawyer. In fact, the
"client" in such situations is often relieved that it will not be necessary for
him to consult a lawyer. Contrast this to a typical patient who spends one
hour in a doctor's office. The patient is apt to spend thirty minutes wait-
ing (attended by secretaries dressed in white) ; twenty minutes being in-
terviewed and tested (by nurses and technicians); and only ten minutes
with the doctor himself. Yet that patient leaves with a sense of well being,
telling himself he has "been to the doctor" (and experienced the solicitous
care of a whole team of supervised sub-professionals).
Assuming a public defender's office as the employer, how might a law
agent be utilized? The goal is to create a job description consisting of tasks
normally done by a lawyer which could be done more economically by a
reasonably skilled layman. Plea bargaining, because it follows patterns
14 See ABA, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROVIDING DEFENSE
SERVICES 23 (1968). In 1968 the ABA resolved: "(1) That the legal profession recognize that
there are many tasks in serving a client's needs which can be performed by a trained non-lawyer
assistant working under the direction and supervision of a lawyer; (2) That the profession en-
courage the training and employment of such assistants .... " Proceedings of the August 1968
Meeting of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Ass'n, 54 A.B.A.J. 1021 (1968). See also
The AM. ASSEMBLY, REPORT ON LAW AND CHANGING SOCIETY 2 (1968).
149 Of course, the availability of the law agent enhances the lawyer's intrinsic capacity to ac-
cept more cases. For instance, one firm in the United States that handles defense of workman's
compensation and other insurance claims employs only three lawyers and twenty-three lay per-
sonnel. The operations of this firm are described in the NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT, UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CORPORATION, PARAPROFESSIONALS IN LEGAL SERVICE




which are usually routine, is an appropriate example of a job that might
include the use of a law agent. The following is an attempt to list most of
the separate tasks involved in plea bargaining, and to suggest which ones
might be performed by a law agent and a lawyer.
Task Performed by
Securing release from detention law agent
Examination and analysis of charging instrument both
Initial counseling with client relative to plea law agent
Investigation law agent
Briefing law agent
Analysis and examination of elements of the crime both
Analysis and examination of admissibility of evidence lawyer
Negotiation with prosecutor lawyer
Making final decision as to plea with client lawyer
Division of labor along these lines would insure that the lawyer remains
the person who analyzes, counsels, and negotiates, thus making maximum
use of his expertise. The tasks performed by the law agent do not detract
from the image of the legal profession, and they dramatically increase the
volume of cases one lawyer might handle.
The sentencing stage of the criminal process is another example of an
area where law agents might be utilized effectively. From the lawyer's
perspective, the sentencing process has four parts: (1) verification of the
presentence report, (2) development of sentencing alternatives, (3) the
presentation to the judge, and (4) interpretation of the sentence to the
defendant. There appears to be no logical reason why a law agent could
not perform the tasks of verifying the presentence report and developing
sentencing alternatives."' These tasks are essentially investigative, and may
be performed by any person with some training in social work. In fact, a
law agent with proper training could probably perform these tasks better
than the average lawyer since the lawyer normally does not have the type
of training necessary to conduct a thorough presentence analysis.
Admittedly, the efficient and economic use of law agents is limited to a
high volume, institutionalized type of law practice, such as that normally
found in a public defender's office. The use of the law agent is further
limited to predetermined routine matters, and thus the law agent lacks the
versatility of the lawyer. Given these inherent limitations, the law agent
offers the legal profession an opportunity to improve the delivery of legal
service by diverting many of the time consuming mechanical tasks away
from the lawyer. The legal profession is being damaged by its reluctance
to grasp the concept of para-professionals. As the doctrine or right to coun-
sel expands, it will force the issue of the futility of lawyers continuing to
perform mechanical tasks."'
'50 Laymen are performing these tasks now in one experimental program. See Keys, Extra-Legal
Help for Defendants, 24 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 15 (1965).
sa "The cooperation and help of laymen, as well as of lawyers is necessary if the right of rea-
sonable access to the courts is to be available to the indigents among us." Johnson v. Avery, 393




The sixth amendment states that in all criminal prosecutions an accused
should have the right to counsel for his defense. At the time the sixth
amendment was written the most conspicuous stage of the criminal justice
process was the trial stage where the question of guilt and punishment
were adjudicated. Accordingly, the right to counsel as written in the sixth
amendment was probably intended to encompass counsel at trial only. As
new stages were recognized and developed through the years, the criminal
justice process grew into a series of interdependent stages in the form of a
continuum. Some of these new stages occur before trial, for example the
stage where a line-up is conducted for identification. Other stages in the
continuum occur after trial, as in the case of parole or post-conviction re-
lief.
As the stages in the criminal justice continuum grew in number and
complexity it became apparent that the defense of an accused in a criminal
prosecution involved much more than simply the trial of a criminal case.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court set out to expand the doctrine of right
to counsel to include many of the preadjudication and postadjudication
stages of the continuum. Since it is not yet feasible to provide every ac-
cused with a lawyer at every stage in the continuum the Court has chosen
to require counsel at those stages where the risk of incurring the stigma of
conviction is the greatest.
In order to accomplish its objective of requiring a lawyer at selected
stages in the criminal justice continuum, the Supreme Court has been
forced to deal with the language of the sixth amendment. In some ways
this amendment proved to be a millstone; the language requiring counsel
at "criminal prosecutions" was too narrow, while the language requiring
counsel at "all criminal prosecutions" was too broad. Where the Court is
challenged to extend the right to counsel to a non-adjudicatory stage of
the continuum, it is faced with the constraining language of "criminal
prosecutions." Where the Court is not ready to extend the right to counsel
(i.e., misdemeanors) it is faced with the expansive language of "all crimi-
nal prosecutions."
The Court has solved this dilemma by the substitution of the fourteenth
amendment for the sixth as the doctrinal basis in some right to counsel
cases. In this fashion the Court has succeeded in expanding the right to
counsel to some of the non-trial stages of the continuum. At the same time,
the Court has succeeded in limiting the scope of right to counsel so that
it does not overburden the resources of the bar and the states which must
supply the additional lawyers required.
The Supreme Court's apparent motive for requiring the presence of
lawyers at these new stages of the continuum is to insure fairness to the
accused, but, in fact, the lawyers' presence will have a far greater impact.
The extension of the right to counsel to the preadjudication and postad-
judication stages already has resulted in a plethora of new tasks for the
lawyer. The whole thrust of the lawyering job is moving from the trial
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stage to other stages where, heretofore, men of "goodwill" have reigned
and ruled without interference. As a result, the entire criminal justice con-
tinuum may undergo some basic systemic changes. For example, in order
to insure fairness to the accused, the right to counsel was recently extend-
ed to probation revocation hearings. But, from the standpoint of the crim-
inal justice system, the presence of lawyers at those hearings may mean
that they will become more formal, and perhaps less frequent, due to the
lawyers' constant insistence upon the due process model.
The legal profession will also feel the impact of the doctrine of right
to counsel. The profession will be forced to improve its capacity for the
delivery of more and better justice. The doctrine of right to counsel has
dramatized the nexus between the lawyer and the due process norm in
criminal justice. Lawyers cannot expect to maintain their position as in-
surers of fairness unless their qualifications, availability, and acceptability
are coordinated with the expectations of their clients and the public gen-
erally. This means that the legal profession must find a way to supply
affordable legal service.
The legal profession and legal education have not caught up with the
doctrine of right to counsel. There are not enough affordable lawyers to
fulfill its promise. Even if such lawyers were available, they would not
be intellectually prepared to render the type of legal service most appro-
priate for many of the non-trial stages of the criminal continuum. In order
to keep pace with the new roles that are developing for lawyers, the legal
profession and its educational system must shift its focus from the ad-
versary model towards a more rational model, one that emphasizes the dis-
covery, presentation, and assessment of facts. Furthermore, the profession
must give more consideration to the use of para-professionals to render
routine legal service in the criminal justice continuum.
These are the challenges of the doctrine of right to counsel.
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